Raising the Stakes: Will Iran Develop Nuclear Capability?

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Last updated: 18/05/2011 14:10:13

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Where: Regional

When: 3-10yrs

How Fast: Years

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Keywords:

Iran, United States, Iraq, terror, terrorist, war on terror, nuclear, power, Europe, European, Middle East

Summary

Iran is currently developing a nuclear enrichment capacity. This is permitted under the Nuclear Weapon Non Proliferation Treaty – however, both the European Union and the United States are opposed to such developments, particularly when such enrichment technology can have a dual usage. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election and controversial re-election has heightened tensions. American and European politicians have perceived him as promoting a bellicose and nationalist foreign policy. Should Iran continue to develop nuclear enrichment capacity, and should such international tensions develop further, this could become intertwined with other political tensions in the region, deepening conflict and hostilities.

Discussion

Countries in Europe and North America have been unsure about the political regime in Tehran since it was established in 1979. [1] Recently, the possibility of confrontation has increased as a result of Iran’s nuclear programme and international perceptions of the implications of this programme. Iran insists that the nuclear programme is for domestic energy only, arguing its right for peaceful nuclear technology under the Non Proliferation Treaty. However, possibilities of the dual capacity of the programme – its potential use in weapons development [2] - and the Iranian government’s refusal to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections have caused alarm in the US and Europe. Over the last decade, preventing the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb has become a key priority of western powers.

Though there is no stated difference in EU and US policy aims on Iran’s nuclear programme, there appear to be some differences in terms of how each would plan to address the issue. For example, France, Germany and Britain have been willing to help Iran with its nuclear energy programme as long as Iran abandons military plans. [3] The US and Israel have been less willing to concede any nuclear enrichment capacity to Iran for fear that Iran would continue a secret nuclear weapons program. [4] Overall, approaches by European and North American governments to Iran’s nuclear program have been criticised for being ineffective and not providing Iran with incentives to reach a nuclear agreement. [5]

To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-peaceful uses, Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on its enrichment program, including, for example, ratification of the Additional Protocol. [6] However, Iran has continued to refuse to completely suspend enrichment and, as a result, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran. [7] In response to UNSC sanctions, Iran has ceased its voluntary cooperation and non-legally binding implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. [5]

A number of other factors could serve to increase the existing tension into a crisis:
1) The election of Mahomud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 and his re-election in 2009, which was widely protested domestically and criticized internationally: President Ahmadinejad is committed to the Islamic revolution of 1979, and his anti-Israeli remarks have hardened resolve in Tel Aviv and Washington to resist Iran’s nuclear programme. [1] [8] President Ahmadinejad has also spoken out against the UNSC for imposing sanctions on Iran. He has argued that Iran has been willing to negotiate, but that European countries and the US are resisting open debate. [9] Moreover, the IAEA has reported a lack of cooperation by Iran. [10]

2) Heightened nuclear capacity in Iran could increase broader instability between countries in the Middle East: The Iranian nuclear programme could be perceived by neighbouring countries as an attempt towards regional domination. Developments in Iran have already sparked interest in establishing nuclear power programs in other Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. An Iranian nuclear programme could also contribute to some religious unrest in the region. Iran is not an Arab country, and the majority of the population of Iran adhere to Shia Islam, whereas Shia Muslims are the minority in its neighbouring countries. Sunni Arab governments have even turned to the IAEA for assistance in starting nuclear programs [11] and have used economic means to persuade Russia and China to support sanctions against Iran’s program. [12]

3) Fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah, and sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq: These conflicts have been linked to Iran, its religion and its politics [13] [14] The perception that Iran is contributing to such conflicts could cause western countries to take a firmer stance against Iran and its nuclear programme.

Implications

Recent developments and tensions suggest that Iranian authorities are unlikely to abandon their nuclear programme. The majority of Iranians appear to support their country’s nuclear program. [15] Furthermore the presence of US forces in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the Arabian Gulf could incite a siege mentality in Tehran, which is not conducive to compromise. [4] President Obama’s election in the US in 2008 began a more diplomatic approach in negotiations with Teheran. Nevertheless, the US still demands Iran stops its illicit nuclear program. [16] At an extreme, some in the US have demanded a regime change in Iran. [1] It is likely that Iran’s nuclear programme will continue, as well as some continued tensions with the US.

In such a scenario, nuclear developments in Iran could provoke US/Israeli air strikes to destroy facilities. [17] A wider conflict could develop if Iran is engages in the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah (which Iran backs).

Any conflict with Iran would likely severely disrupt oil exports affecting imports into the United Kingdom and many other oil-importing countries. Under these circumstances, a financial panic could ensue, contributing to a sharp rise in the price of oil for consumers and business. Iran’s trading links with Russia and China mean those countries might oppose intervention.

Finally, open and direct involvement by the UK in conflicts with Iran could become part of motivations for acts of terrorism in the UK.

Early indicators

Iran continues to fail to meets its obligations to report its enrichment activities to the IAEA.
Iran continues to accelerate its nuclear programme, beyond the second enrichment facility constructed in 2009.
Iran is able to be successful in its attempts to acquire fissile materials.
Iranian involvement in Iraq and Lebanon increases.
Increased US military presence in the Gulf region.

Drivers & Inhibitors

Drivers:
Refusal of the Iranians to allow IAEA inspectors into their country.
Lack of success in the EU diplomacy.
Refusal of any form of compromise among any and all involved parties.
Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Shiite militants in Iraq.
Apocalyptic rhetoric of Ahmadinejad.
Continued work of Iranians on a nuclear programme.

Inhibitors:
European/UN brokered diplomacy.

Parallels & Precedents

Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities in 1981.
Invasion of Iraq in 2003 justified partly as elimination of the threat from a rogue regime.
Oil crisis in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War.

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Sources

Ref.	Publisher	Date	Title	Category
1	Open Democracy		[3] Rogers, Paul (2005) ‘Iran and the United States: A Clash of Perceptions’, Opendemocracy.net, 3rd November	Pol
2	Other		[7] British-American Security Information Council (2005) 'Briefing 15: Addressing the Challenge of Iran'	Pol
3	Centre for European Reform Policy		[5] Leonard, Mark (2005) ‘Crunch Time on Iran: Five ways out of a Nuclear Crisis’, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, August	Pol
4	Open Democracy		[9] Tehrani, Ardashir (2005) 'Iran's Presidential Coup', Opendemocracy.net, 21st April	Pol
5	BBC	24/09/2005	Timeline: Iran nuclear crisis	Econ
6	BBC	18/12/2003	Iran signs up to nuclear checks	Econ
7	The Daily Telegraph	18/05/2010	World's powers agree 'strong draft' sanctions against Iran	Econ
8	Oxford Research Group		[8] Barnaby, Frank (2005) 'Iran's Nuclear Activities', Oxford Research Group, November	Pol
9	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	03/03/2009	Karim Sadjadpour (2009) Iranian Political and Nuclear Realities and U.S. Policy Options.Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Econ
10	International Atomic Energy Agency	19/11/2008	Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran	Econ
11	Reuters	22/03/2009	Fredrik Dahl (2009) Iran sets terms for U.S. ties	Econ
12	Haaretz	17/05/2009	Avi Issacharoff (2009) Arab League: Israel's nuclear program more worrying than Iran	Econ
13	Open Democracy		[12] Rogers, Paul (2005) 'Targeting Iran', Opendemocracy.net, 7th July	Pol
14	The Atlantic Monthly		[13] Henry, T. (2005) 'The Covert Option: Can sabotage and assassination stop Iran from going nuclear?', The Atlantic Monthly, December	Pol
15	BBC	14/01/2009	BBC (2009) Iranians 'worried about economy'	Econ
16	The New York Times	26/07/2009	David E. Sanger (2009) Clinton Says Nuclear Aim of Iran Is Fruitless	Econ
17	Oxford Research Group		[11] Rogers, Paul (2005) 'Endless War: The global war on terror and the new Bush administration', Oxford Research Group, March	Pol

Other Sources

Link	User
BBC News Profile: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	JB2

The contents of this paper were provided by the Outsights-Ipsos MORI Partnership. Any views expressed are independent of government and do not constitute government policy.