Politics > International Relations >
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After the Oil: The Future of the Middle East |
| Paper ID: |
491 |
Last updated: 17/05/2012 03:15:00
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Criteria:  |
Impact:  |
Likelihood:  |
Controversy: |
Where: Regional |
When: 11-20yrs |
How Fast: Years |
1
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| Keywords: |
middle east, energy, resources |
Summary  |
| The Middle East accounts for 53% of the world's oil reserves, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for 19% of the total. [1] Economic growth in the Middle East has relied almost solely on oil reserves for sixty years. Increasing demand for oil from the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and other emerging economies may see oil demand increase by up to 50% by 2030 with a corresponding rise in prices. [2] On the basis of known reserves, it is estimated that oil will run out by about 2050. [3] As oil revenues decline, the Middle East will need to explore new directions for growth to sustain and develop the region |
Discussion |
Autocracy tends to be more durable in countries with substantial resource wealth [4] and some analysts suggest that the Middle East’s oil wealth has prevented long-term political and economic development, [5], [6] and that oil exporters have been able to use accumulated wealth to compensate for inefficient public service investment. Governance in many Middle Eastern states remains strongly theocratic [7] and the majority of Middle Eastern regimes are autocracies. Today, only Iraq and Israel are recognised as democracies. [8] The high price of oil may mean that we continue to see a process of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ [8], [9], [6] in which autocracies become stronger, more flexible, and more resilient than ever. [10]
Currently, Middle Eastern countries' principal export is oil; because their economies are not diversified and complementary, there is little regional trade. [11] Ironically, though the Arab states pioneered regional economic and political integration, the Middle East today has the least intra-regional trade in the world. To date, only the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) has had any success in terms of trade integration, creating labour and capital mobility and setting common standards in various areas of regulation. [12] The growth of trade in the Middle East may depend on economic diversification [13], [6], [14] and political commitments to peaceful coexistence, building on existing trade agreements such as GAFTA [15] and MEFTA. [16]
While some Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are heavily dependent on the export of oil, a number of countries are starting to diversify and move to more ‘sustainable’ economic models [17], [18] in preparation for a post-oil era. The growth of banking [19], [20] and Islamic finance, as a result of oil-fuelled liquidity, could push economies in the Middle East to become more efficient and equitable, [21] promoting risk-sharing rather than speculation in a virtuous but vigorous way. [22] There is already evidence that this may be happening, for example, the development of sharia compliant hedge funds. [23] Effective financial institutions may also encourage the rise of the Muslim middle classes by popularising Islamic insurance products that help use savings productively.
Other Middle Eastern economies have diversified in other directions. The United Arab Emirates has a highly globalised economy that embraces new industry and generates 63% of its income from commerce and tourism, despite possessing rich oil reserves. Dubai is one of the world’s fastest growing economies. [24] The emirate leads the commerce and tourism drive through a deregulated system, allowing substantial labour immigration, which accounts for 75% of the City’s population. Dubai has accommodated this immigrant population by being more culturally tolerant; for example, allowing drinking and adult entertainment. [25] Dubai has also actively courted the wealthy through the provision of luxury hotels and services. [14]
The potential energy shortfall of the post-oil economy is a key area of concern for Middle Eastern states. However, the climate and geography of the Middle East make it a potential world leader in the development and production of solar energy. Abu Dhabi leads the region in preparation for the energy shortfalls of a post-oil economy and has committed to building a $350 million solar power plant, the first of its kind in the region. As part of the plant, a special economic zone is being set up dedicated to alternative energy and sustainable technology. [26], [7] Israel is planning to generate solar energy on a large scale, while also creating an electric car network zone. [27]
Other nations, notably Iran, are planning for a post-oil future by developing their own nuclear power generation programme. [28] Although nuclear power may be required to fill an energy shortfall [29], [30] and the prospect of war has receded for some, [31] there is potential for wrangling over Iran’s nuclear future that might presage an ‘era of persistent engagement’ and a conflict without limits or ends. [32], [33]
Iran will remain a significant actor in shaping relationships within the Middle East and with the West. The emergence of an Iran with nuclear capability would emphasise its growing regional and world influence and ability to influence other regional actors, for example in prompting a “regional cascade of proliferation” [34] or fomenting terrorist activity. Some states, notably Saudi Arabia and Israel, would be threatened by an Iran with nuclear capability. Israel might even act unilaterally to prevent Iran’s nuclear development. [35]
Regional stability may depend on intra-regional agreements such as the Arab Peace Initiative, [36] which was endorsed by the Arab League at the Riyadh Summit in 2007 and which later resurfaced at the 2008 Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free Trade. This process at least signals an attempt by Arab nations to offer a unified proposal for settling their conflict with Israel.
The Israel-Palestine conflict continues to play a key role in shaping the politics of the Middle East. Much will depend on US, Palestinian and Israeli leadership. Tzipi Livni, leader of the Kadima party in Israel recently painted a cautiously optimistic picture of successful negotiations that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, the future of the conflict is as unpredictable as ever especially given that a two-state solution may be losing currency amongst Palestinians. [37] [38] Some analysts suggest that focusing less on the conflict may be more constructive for the Middle East as a whole. Abdulla-Janahi, Co-chair of the WEF Middle East Forum 2008, has urged regional leaders not to “hijack the Palestinian issue” to divert attention from domestic problems. [12] He suggests they have used it to divert attention from failures to “create the environment to create entrepreneurship and equal opportunities for people.”
Religion, particularly Islam, plays a defining role in the domestic and geopolitical developments in the Middle East. [39] Economic liberalism in the Middle East is rarely accompanied by social liberalism, and strict, usually Islamic theology tends to dominate Middle Eastern societies. [40] Religious difference could prove to be a stumbling block to integration and understanding both within the Middle East and in relations with the rest of the World.
Developments in the interpretation and practice of Islam open up a new set of possibilities for the role of religion in the region.
Reinterpretation of the Quran [41] could see a moderation and liberalisation of Islam across the Middle East or provide a counter-discourse to globalisation [42] characterised by self-reliant communities, gender equality and non-capitalist economics. [43], [44]
The role of Saudi Arabia is likely to be influential in shaping Islam in the Middle East and beyond. Leading figures such as King Abdullah [45] may already be propagating a more tolerant Islam, negotiating dialogue and influencing formerly hard-line groups such as the Muslim World League (MWL) in a more moderate direction.
Population increases in the Middle East have been described as “staggering”. [46] In Saudi Arabia 40% of the population is less than 15 years old and in the Middle East and North African region population has quadrupled since 1950. [47]
Expanding populations may be forced to choose between growing more food or preserving scarce water supplies, particularly as Gulf countries already import 60% of their food. [48] Water is likely to become ever more politically and strategically important, especially in locations such as the West Bank where access is restricted by a lack of infrastructure. [49]
To prepare for potential resource scarcity, Gulf countries are already cooperating with and investing in developing countries that have similar cultural, religious, and political backgrounds - such as Pakistan and India - to secure food supplies. In June 2008, Pakistan sought “US$6 billion in financial and oil aid in return for hundreds of thousands of acres [hectares] of agricultural land, which could be tilled by the Saudis." [48] These arrangements may become increasingly common in the future if resource scarcity increases.
Availability of food is also closely related to the price of oil. Increasing oil prices incentivise the production of biofuels, which in turn may inflate global food prices. High food prices are thought to be at least partly responsible for political unrest in poorer Middle Eastern states such as Egypt [12] and Yemen. [50]
Demographic change also presents significant employment and service challenges. In the post-oil era, the future of the Middle East will depend on its people. The key to the region’s success will be the creation of new jobs for the millions of young people entering the workforce. Saudi Arabia has responded to this by committing itself to a $500 billion investment to build cities, create jobs and diversify the economy. [7], [51] However, many jobs are low skilled and labour intensive and much new investment is in real estate.
Some suggest that commercial culture in the Middle East may remain wedded too closely to patronage rather than meritocracy. The region will need entrepreneurs and small companies to promote the growth of new, dynamic industries and capitalise on the wealth derived from oil money and substantial flows of inward investment. [52] This in turn will depend to a large extent on governments in the region moving further towards economic reform and a more open business environment. [53]
Although venture capital may be lagging behind other sorts of finance in emerging markets, some suggest that entrepreneurship is beginning to take hold across the Middle East as younger people realise that trading ideas may offer a better route to riches than land or oil. [54]
Economic inclusion and social empowerment of women, youth and those of diverse cultural backgrounds are critical goals with such a young population. [21] Economic development will also depend on developing an appropriate infrastructure both institutionally and in terms of education and skills. Educational reforms should lead to socioeconomic change that reduces the dominance of governments and family-run conglomerates.
Some suggest economic prosperity will depend on an educated workforce delivering competitive private services. [21], [55] The establishment of universally accessible, high quality education services may help transform the growing young population into a productive workforce. Iran and Saudi Arabia are beginning to acknowledge the importance of educational reform based on future economic needs. [27], [56], [57] This may also require making use of human capital, perhaps through greater access to the labour market for women through the diversification of industry. [58][59] While an economy focused on oil production has traditionally reduced the need for women in the job market, weakening their position in society, the development of a broader manufacturing industry may create more jobs for women, enhancing their role.
Information technology may play a crucial role in economic development in the region, enabling the spread of locally-generated content and e-learning, encouraging social and economic growth and beginning to bridge the digital divide within the region and between the Middle East and the West. [60], [61] Currently only 4% of people in the Arab world have broadband access. Increasing access to the internet may be the best way to promote democracy in the Middle East. [62] As people become better informed, demands for democracy may strengthen. [56] [41] [51]
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Implications |
The US relationship with the Middle East will be a major driver of future change in the region. For example, a change of regime in the US could significantly alter the relationship between Iran and the West. Parag Khanna has suggested that an ‘unprecedented’ shift in the stance of the US towards Iran, in which Iran received "everything they want in terms of Western investment in energy, freer trade, diplomatic recognition, and increased cultural and student exchanges — if they oust President Ahmadinejad" [63] could herald a new era in the relationship between the West and Middle East. The relative decline of US power would mean that the UK and the EU would be important partners in making this change possible.
The kind of radical regime change suggested by Khanna may not come to pass, especially if high oil prices insulate existing regimes from public pressure for reform. Without improved relationships between the West and Iran in particular, it may not be long before Iran acquires both nuclear weapons and the long-range systems required for delivery. Development of nuclear capabilities within the region may intensify intra-regional and extra-regional tensions, particularly between Iran and Israel and Sunni countries. A domino-style arms race in the region could unfold, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt developing their own nuclear capabilities [64] in a ‘MAD (mutually assured deterrence) scramble. ’ Without a US presence Iraq could become the arena in which the battle for regional influence is played out [65] between Iran and a loose-knit Sunni coalition of Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Relations between Iran and the West could reach an all time low, while Israel remains caught between its reliance on the US and the perceived failure of the US to adequately protect its interests. In response, the election of a 'hawkish' US administration could see an increase in US assistance to Israel, renewing Israeli confidence and bellicosity in the region. A China reliant on Middle Eastern oil may provide backing for Iran among other threatened Middle Eastern states. The potential for a second cold war, played out through proxy conflicts in the Middle East, would become a possibility. It is unlikely that the UK would be able to avoid involvement in such a conflict.
At the same time, the validity of multilateral and international agreements could be seriously impaired if some states in the Middle East begin a process of reneging on the obligations of multilateral agreements such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Indeed, this would set a dangerous precedent that could undermine the very possibility of multilateral, global governance.
Economic success in the Middle East may depend on the possibilities for economic and political integration, developing attractive environments for investment and the development of an advanced telecoms infrastructure with widespread broadband internet availability and high levels of internet penetration in urban and rural areas. Development of a common market, drawing heavily on the best of other political and economic regional arrangements, particularly the EU, may make regional integration a reality. [66]
A better connected and more open business environment may become increasingly attractive for business from outside the Middle East, notably Western financial firms and venture capitalists. At the same time, the region may consolidate its position as the leading locus of Islamic banking. The development of more meritocratic and transparent business practices, growth of FDI and the transfer of skills from foreign multinationals could further increase the economic dynamism of the Middle East.
High oil prices could allow massive investment in public infrastructure, particularly health and education, to equip the Middle Eastern ‘demographic asset’ [67] with twenty-first century skills. A socially conscious period of sustainable ‘investment to save’ could be accompanied by a growing environmental awareness in the region, particularly if Masdar City [68] is deemed a success. Indeed, Masdar may become a new paradigm for urban and infrastructure development in the region and beyond.
Burgeoning environmental awareness coupled to the need for energy solutions in a post-oil era and the availability of young, skilled labour may lead to a proliferation of start-up organisations with a focus on renewable energy and science and technology. Some Middle Eastern governments are also able to invest their vast oil wealth in developing energy technologies that would otherwise not be economically viable, in order to ensure they eventually become competitive.
There may be a particular focus on energy and resource sustainability, particularly focusing on food and water through improving agricultural methods, GM crops and advances in desalination technologies. [69] [70] The UAE may lead the region and the world in large-scale production of solar power enabled through ever improving storage mechanisms, [71] and Israel may become the leader in the widespread development and adoption of electric car networks made accessible through improved fuel battery technology. [72] Initially small-scale technology ventures may benefit from and provide opportunity for involvement from Western venture capitalists or research and development assistance from UK universities.
It is unlikely that all individual countries in the Middle East will be able to develop self sufficiency in farming and food production. States in the region may increasingly look to sustainable food-for-oil exchanges notably with China, Pakistan and India. It is conceivable that these kinds of relationships could also develop with other states in the West. Many Middle Eastern states could be more seriously afflicted by resource scarcity, particularly scarcity of water, [73] another potential source of conflict between states in the region.
A resource-hungry nation could take advantage of the desperation of Middle Eastern states to negotiate cut-price deals for oil in exchange for food. There is also the possibility of different forms of exchange, for example, from a position of bargaining strength China may seek to send some of its population to the Middle East to solve problems of overpopulation and pollution. However, this may simply increase the resource scarcity problems of the region. [74]
Some Middle Eastern states may develop their comparative advantage in areas such as flower-growing which do not require much water and can be a high-value export. [47] Certain countries are likely to develop their tourism industries and perhaps their offerings for green tourism and eco-tourism for the Western market. Dubai and Abu Dhabi in particular may vie for pre-eminence in global finance and tourism in the twenty-first century, lying at the epicentre of Middle Eastern, Asian, European and African markets. [75]
If allowed to develop, a new mood of economic openness could prompt a liberalisation of societal relations, greater gender equality and increased media freedom in the region. This could in turn see Islam entering a new phase of moderation and tolerance that builds on clerical reinterpretation of the Quran and a softening of traditionally hard-line elements. This shift of mood may encourage the widespread emergence of a more consensual Islam that emphasises open governance and the rule of law, a relatively dogma-free, dynamic interpretation of the Quran through ‘Islam 2.0’. [76] This could be facilitated by the internet and the emergence of a truly global Islam, influenced by a new generation of Muslim youth movements, entrepreneurs and NGOs.
Increasing popularity and acceptance of a more moderate interpretation of Islam might mean that terrorism is increasingly seen as an illegitimate tool in the struggle for Islam. [46]
However, against a background of political unrest, potential conflict and insubstantial public and private investment, society in the Middle East would remain in a state of aborted development. The Middle Eastern ‘demographic asset’ may remain under-recognised and underutilised. Education, which in other regions is the way for youth to make the transition to employment, could remain a failure in the Middle East. [67] With only patchy attempts to create new forms of employment on a relatively small scale in richer states such as Jordan and Lebanon, the region could suffer a significant rise in unemployment.
Without provision of adequate education or employment opportunities in the region, small-scale entrepreneurship, social or otherwise, touted as the most likely means of creating jobs for 100 million extra people in the work force, [77], [78] may never materialise. Record levels of unemployment particularly amongst young, low-skilled males may create a tinder box of political and economic unrest [12] further reinforcing the huge societal inequalities across the Middle East, where the middle class has been virtually eradicated. [79] The region could suffer an ‘exodus of talent’ as what is left of the middle class and intelligentsia leaves the region for better opportunities and more security. [80] As the region becomes less and less secure, demographic realities may be kept in check only by an increasingly autocratic and theocratic set of regimes.
Certain countries, notably Egypt, may be especially prone to this mixture of extreme theology and social deprivation that could culminate in revolution and overthrow of existing rulers. [63] In this instance there may be a case for identifying particularly fragile regimes and engaging sooner rather than later with alternative power centres in the country in question. [63]
The consolidation of power of theocratic regimes across the region could mean a more widespread embrace of extreme forms of Islam such as Wahhabism. [81] This could provide a new wellspring of militants and new and diverse waves of terrorist activity that use a diverse array of techniques, such as electronic attacks. [82] Al-Qa’ida and other religiously motivated forms of terrorism may be accompanied by a rise in state-sponsored terrorism and cyber-nationalism that foments ethnic hatred, particularly focused on the Israel-Palestine conflict, [83] and new forms of economically motivated terrorism that lacks leadership but targets nodes of economic power and prestige. [32] The Gulf Coast countries, best positioned to combat centres of Al Qa’ida activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, [84] could become no-go areas for Western troops.
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Early indicators |
Exponential rises in oil prices create further huge national wealth.
Saudi Arabia becomes ambassador of moderate Islam.
Internet use in the Middle East breaks the 100m user barrier. [85]
The EU model of regional integration is responsible for significant trade increases.
Iran develops nuclear weapons.
Masdar becomes the global standard in eco-urban design.
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Drivers & Inhibitors |
Domestic investment in health, education and infrastructure.
Battle for influence between Wahabbism and more moderate Islam.
Progress of alternative energy storage and dissemination technologies |
Parallels & Precedents |
Formation of the EU Coal and Steel Community.
Formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Creation of the Arab Peace Initiative.
Founding of Minhaj-ul-Quran.
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| The contents of this paper were provided by the Outsights-Ipsos MORI Partnership. Any views expressed are independent of government and do not constitute government policy. |
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