One Flag, Many Nations: The Establishment of an International Army?

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Last updated: 18/05/2011 14:03:36

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Where: Global

When: 11-20yrs

How Fast: Years

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armed forces, arm, peacekeeper, arms, conflict, war, military, international, UN

Summary

The globalised nature of security threats (for example, terrorism and transnational organized crime; disruption of trade flows due to piracy; conflict which produces refugee flows and humanitarian crises) coupled with increasingly constrained national resources for defence has pushed states towards increasing cooperation in security and defence.

These trends indicate that within the next two decades, we may see the establishment of an international standing army, entirely under the command of a single authority.

The argument for a United Nations standing force would lie in its perceived legitimacy as a neutral actor rather than a coalition of national interests, though this has also been compromised in recent years by its perceived ineffectiveness in peacekeeping operations (for example, Central Africa, Sierra Leone, and Somalia).

An expanded European Union or NATO force is also possible and unlikely to be vastly different to the situation currently in place. However, any expanded EU or NATO military role is likely to be seen as a threat to other global powers and could be the cause for a more aggressive foreign policy on their part (i.e. Russia, China). EU states which have refused to join the Euro, like Denmark and Sweden, might also refuse to subscribe to an EU fighting force. In either case, the context of states’ unwillingness to ’go it alone’, an international standing force could become the preferred actor to deal with complex problems of conflict resolution and state-building.

Discussion

In the future, a permanent international military force could be established to share the burden of the addressing the changing nature of global threats. Countries could become less likely to commit forces unilaterally, but rather as part of an international military entity, such as the European Rapid Reaction force, an overhauled UN-armed component, or under the auspices of NATO.

The globalization of communication media has heightened international awareness or (and public pressure to resolve) grievances outside state boundaries where the state is unable or unwilling to intervene, and in some cases is the perpetrator of such atrocities[1] (i.e. Serbia/Kosovo – this was first properly recognized following the holocaust but has become more established in recent years). In order to help resolve such problems, an international intervention has at times been required – however, these conflicts tend to be messy and can involve substantial reconstruction of state structures, making them an indeterminate and resource-intensive enterprise that individual states can be unwilling to commit to. Furthermore, peacekeeping and peace building interventions require an international consensus, a precondition which attempts to ensure the perceived legitimacy of the countries involved in the host nation, as well as more globally. [2]

Globalization also has had an impact on the changing nature of threats by increasing economic interdependence; this means that such threats are perceived as global, [3] and concurrently, a global response can be required, again with states unwilling to bear the resource burden individually in many cases. Examples include threats to commercial sea-lanes, acts of piracy on the high seas, civil conflict and violent destabilisation of areas which can cause migratory or refugee flows, disruption of resource supply lines or the encouragement of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [3]

These trends have had implications for strategy - where ‘failed’ or fragile states’ volatility present operational and strategic difficulties, or conflict produces a humanitarian crisis, a purely military solution is often recognized as being insufficient. The challenge of post-conflict reconstruction demands a long term, integrated civil-military approach, which can be hugely resource-intensive. Multilateralism can allow states to share the burden of cost. An international consensus can also enhance legitimacy. Furthermore, a standing force with an enhanced ability to coordinate civil and military elements could mitigate coordination problems, which often plague nation-building attempts. [4]

The establishment of a permanent set of international armed forces could develop out of existing trends of current international military cooperation (e.g. NATO, the UN, the nascent EU Rapid Reaction Force or the soldiers of the African Union). As of May 2006, the UN already has 18 operations worldwide involving 89,000 personnel of various kinds, whilst NATO is also operating in 5 countries – including 20,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. Neither NATO nor the UN have permanent armed forces at their disposal, but rather rely upon contributions from their members – contributions which are not always forthcoming.

An international standing army could be established and governed by a body such as the UN. [5] In this scenario, the purpose of such a force would likely be an expansion of existing UN concerns of extending state security to the realm of human security and human rights. This would likely require the development of a strategic doctrine concerning when, where and how to act – reliance on ad hoc decision-making in a quickly evolving conflict has proved overly slow and difficult in the past. Other issues such a proposal would need to consider include: the size of the force and the type of military capabilities it would have, how it would be recruited and funded, and the extent that it would add to or replace existing methods of raising troops. Finally, long-term peacekeeping missions may continue to be undertaken on a volunteer basis while a standing international army would be employed to deal with short-term immediate crises.

Alternatively, a standing force could be more regional in character though with an international scope, developing out of NATO or EU forces. [6] [7] This is unlikely to be vastly different from the current situation, except that there would be benefits of an already established system, such as efficiency in pooling resources and coordination, and quick reaction. Arguments in favour of such a force could be the relatively low cost of this option, when compared to the disadvantages of not engaging with ‘failing’ or aggressive states. [8]

Implications

Any move toward the formation of an international army will be likely be controversial, conflicting with national foreign policies (see, for example, the disagreement over reinforcing the NATO presence in Afghanistan [9]). The scenario outlined above is likely to suffer from difficulty in obtaining agreement on a single course of action (this has proved very difficult in the UN), as well as tensions between unequal contributions of troops. Such tensions are evidence in NATO, [10] which is predicated on self-defence and self-interest rather than notions of altruism or shared global fate.

If a UN army were to develop, the effectiveness of such a force would rely on a clear international legal system and sanctions process,[11] in order to pre-empt accusations of bias in its use. It could also require its own budget, institutions and college, as well as a unified command and control structure for the purposes of coordination and the development and implementation of a coherent strategic doctrine. Even so, a significant threat to the use of such a force could be disagreements between governments over legitimate use. [8] [12] This has always been one of the most controversial aspects of interventions premised on a global agenda, be it international consensus on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security; or global norms of human rights. A good example of this is Russia’s opposition to intervention in Kosovo, for fear of setting a precedent of interventionism. Similarly, states could also fear the resource commitment of being obligated to act. The establishment of an international force would require greater interdependence and commitment to pooling of sovereignty; as such, attempts to form such an international force could cause serious diplomatic divisions.

Finally, in more practical terms, language or cultural barriers could also prevent forces operating effectively, especially in combat situations.

An extension of either EU or NATO forces could cause tensions and increase competition between the two, and may call for a redefinition of roles and formalized conditions of cooperation. For example, the inefficient duplication of efforts in the airlift over Darfur could be avoided through closer cooperation; indeed, with France back on board with NATO this may make a collaborative rather than competitive relationship. This could build on the strengths of NATO’s military effectiveness and the EU’s strong civil-military capability; NATO does not, as yet, have a reconstruction budget, though this may change in the new strategic doctrine in 2010.

Early indicators

Failure in large humanitarian conflicts or disasters that require large coordinated forces to be inserted rapidly, beyond the scope on any one army.
Proliferation of UN peacekeeping since the 1990s. There were 45 missions between 1990 and 2008 in comparison to 18 between 1948 and 1989. [13]
Increase in EU military deployment - 22 missions in four continents since 2003. [3]
NATO missions in five countries.

Drivers & Inhibitors

Drivers:
The forming and entrenching of international legal standards, and the desire to have them enforced.
The willingness of nations to cede military power to a multi-national force on a permanent basis, requiring a high level of trust and reduced nationalist passion.
The failure of wealthy countries to act promptly in previous crises, such as in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, might be a spur to a more combative and armed approach. [14]
Strong public support for CDSP (76 per cent) in comparison to other EU policies.
The globalization of threats and the high cost of multilateral nation-building activities.
France’s return to NATO.

Inhibitors:
Inability to agree on strategic doctrine and rules of engagement in international military organizations. [3]
Fears over the sovereignty of the nation-state and the lack of accountability.
Eurozone crisis and unwillingness to pledge resources for increased collective armed forces.
Cost, composition and leadership structure disputes.
RacismCultural and linguistic differences.
Cultural and/or ethnic prejudices.
Ineffectiveness of previous international forces.
Widespread inertia within international organisations like the UN or EU.
Competition between NATO and EU.

Parallels & Precedents

EU military action.
NATO.
UN Peacekeepers.
Failure of the League of Nations because no state would contribute to enforcing the League’s decisions.
Failure of the European Defence Community in 1954.
Failure to establish a 60,000 strong EU standing force, over 10 years after it was proposed in Helsinki.

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The contents of this paper were provided by the Outsights-Ipsos MORI Partnership. Any views expressed are independent of government and do not constitute government policy.