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Justice For All: Global Institutions to Become Human Rights-Oriented? |
| Paper ID: |
144 |
Last updated: 31/01/2012 09:08:31
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Criteria:  |
Impact:  |
Likelihood:  |
Controversy:  |
Where: Global |
When: 3-10yrs |
How Fast: Years |
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people thought this paper expanded their thinking
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Keywords:  |
international relations, law, human rights, government, security, trade, business, United Nations, WTO, Security council, sanctions, World Bank |
Summary  |
| In the future, international institutions may become human rights-oriented, to the extent that states that tolerate human rights violations could trigger immediate responses from other countries in the form of trade sanctions, suspension of international credit, and criminal and financial sanctions. An independent global bureaucracy, supported by transnational public opinion, may make political escape through alliances with great powers increasingly difficult. |
Discussion  |
Human rights have become integrated into international legal discourse. However, the widely recognised customary legal status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been crippled by the absence of effective global enforcement mechanisms outside of political condemnation. This situation could be changed if international institutions were to move towards forming a more united and established body to enforce basic human rights.
Pressure to uphold human rights standards from academics and from transnational public opinion could grow, and cause international institutions to become more aware of human rights violations. Through separate and joint action, international organisations could increase the costs imposed on states and political elites that perpetrate human rights violations, and on those that overlook breaches of human rights in their territories (for example, ignoring International Labour Organisation (ILO) labour standards or violating the rights of indigenous peoples). For example, international institutions could deny international assistance to persistent violators and their supporters, or advocate and even institute economic sanctions.
Heightened pressure to respect basic human rights could, in turn, provide space for assessors of human rights violations to gain influence in international institutions. If countries within the Security Council were to become increasingly willing to uphold similar human rights standards, the United Nations (UN) Security Council could become more responsive and use its enforcement tools against persistent individual violators. [1] If persistent vetoes lead to inaction in the Security Council, the UN General Assembly could act pursuant to its subsidiary role (e.g. under the Uniting for Peace Resolution [2]) and authorise voluntary sanctions. In this situation, enforcement would remain in the hands of states, individually or collectively, but would only be legal and legitimate if taken pursuant to an internationally-warranted decision and to the extent authorized by a multilateral organ. The multiplicity of forums could be overcome by linking subjects to organs (e.g., labour law to the ILO; refugee law to the UN High Commissioner).
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights [3] could become a rallying point for building a transnational human rights culture. However, how the Declaration is understood and approached would depend on interpretation by multilateral bodies, and also from a multitude of conventions and treaties that give precedence to human rights concerns. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights could become seen as customary international law, providing possible criteria for use in assessing human rights violations in states and in international institutions.
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Implications  |
If there were to be a growing community of individuals within international organisations with the ability and willingness to assess human rights violations, and/or if there was heightened public pressure to consider human rights violations, states and international organisations may become more willing to enforce human rights standards. New enforcement capabilities could demand states wishing to benefit from global public goods to respect such standards.
If such a direction is taken, explicit support for human rights standards could become a prerequisite for participating in international relations and for accessing growth-promoting opportunities, for example, preferential tariffs in large markets, credit for infrastructure from international financial institutions, etc.
Depending on the extent to which human rights were enforced and adopted into international organisations, political elites refusing to adhere to international human rights standards could be threatened with sanctions, for example, criminal prosecution (for the most grave violations), or financial sanctions and restrictions on travel and access to luxury goods.
Increasing pressure on states to adhere to human rights standards by international organisations could increase tensions between states. States currently operating on the periphery of international political and economic relations such as North Korea and Myanmar could be further antagonised and marginalised. [4] If such states on the periphery turn to isolation in response, enforcement instruments could further segregate these states, which could have negative repercussions for citizens within these states, for instance the impact of economic sanctions on those already in poverty.
Tensions over when and how to enforce particular human rights standards could provoke or contribute to international conflict. [5] Such conflicts could test international enforcement mechanisms, and depending on how different economically and political powerful states respond, such mechanisms could crumble. [6] [7] Also possibly aggravating such developments, heightened requirements and space for states to enforce human rights standards could cause emerging powers to withdraw from international organisations, forming spheres of influence based on less stringent demands for human rights commitments. To prevent such outcomes, international organisations could seek to openly prefer engagement over conflict, and provide opportunities to revise discouraging measures if states review their positions.
Human rights politics could also allow for a major power to breach international treaties on alleged human rights grounds, based on resolutions or declarations by any human rights-related institution. At the other extreme, tacit agreements could develop among states whereby no condemnation is made for fear that it might be used to further political or economic interests.
Such dilemmas over how, and to what extent, to enforce human rights standards may become an impetus to develop a unified international politico-legal mechanism that could examine human rights violations and assess what could constitute an appropriate response, either individual or collective. A unified mechanism could replicate other experiences of coordination of states’ interests and positions on regional (European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement) and universal (World Trade Organisation, International Civil Aviation Organization) levels. |
Early indicators  |
The new UN Human Rights Council, featuring a Universal Periodic Review of the human rights situation in at least every Council member. [8] Consolidation of three regional human rights systems (European, Inter-American and African), covering more than 120 States. Working group for the creation of an ASEAN mechanism in the advanced stage. [9] Preoccupation by international monetary institutions, such as the World Bank, with social development and the rights of indigenous peoples. [10] Framework agreements signed by multinational companies Pressure from developed countries and human rights advocates to include ‘social clauses’ in trade and investment laws to protect labour rights and discourage lowering of labour standards as a competition tool. [11] Effective prosecution of suspects of grave and systematic violations before the International Criminal Court. Prosecution of heads of State (Pinochet, Hissène Habré) by domestic courts on grounds of internationally-warranted universal jurisdiction. Increasing human rights concerns in the UN Security Council, e.g. “smart” sanctions to avoid punishing the population, establishment of criminal tribunals, sanctions on grounds of violation of human rights. Human rights requirements for participation in international organisations and trade blocs, especially in Europe but also in the Americas (OAS Democratic Charter, Mercosur Democratic Clause, NAFTA Social Clause). More modest but important developments towards a human rights culture in Africa and Southeast Asia. |
Drivers & Inhibitors  |
Drivers: Problems affecting all states created by massive human rights violations. Economic problems on the one hand, in the form of refugees, mass displacements of people, and disruption of markets. Security problems on the other hand, since the illegitimate authority will be challenged by discontents, which may favour the appearance of armed insurrections and terrorist organizations. Increased attention paid to human rights abuses around the world, with greater prominence of nongovernmental organisations supporting/representing human rights standards. [12] [13] [14] Advanced technology and the technical ease of recording abuses and transmitting them to audiences around the glove.
Inhibitors: Emergence of great powers with ambiguous commitments towards individual rights (China, Russia) and labour-intensive economies (India, Brazil) who may see the human rights agenda as politically controlled by the West and detrimental to their interests. Persistence of the nation state as the key actor in international relations. Dependence for collective action on agreement among a small number of elite and powerful states. Plurality of fora for addressing human rights issues, with ensuing difficulty in choosing an authoritative standard which would inhibit political misuse of condemnations. |
Parallels & Precedents  |
The elevation of piracy to a universally condemned crime, subject to trial by any state, during the 19th Century. The emergence of nuclear proliferation as a global security concern for its potential effects. Attempts to obtain the bomb are themselves a reason for UN Security Council sanctions (North Korea, Iran). Racist regimes have likewise been faced with sanctions (Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa). The evolution of the European Community, largely a work of Community institutions. Incorporation of human rights to the common market law by the European Court of Justice based not on treaties but on the “common constitutional traditions” of the Members. The creation of a unified legal framework for international trade law, administered by a single organization (the WTO) in order to avoid parallel proceedings and forum shopping. |
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Sources  |
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| The contents of this paper were provided by the Outsights-Ipsos MORI Partnership. Any views expressed are independent of government and do not constitute government policy. |
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